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Abstract. Studies on the large scale peer-to-peer (P2P) network like Gnutella 
have shown the presence of large number of free riders. Moreover, the open and 
decentralized nature of P2P network is exploited by malicious users who dis-
tribute unauthentic or harmful contents. Despite the existence of a number of 
trust management schemes in the literature for combating against free riding 
and distribution of malicious files, these mechanisms are not scalable due to 
their high computational, communication and storage overhead. This paper pre-
sents a trust management scheme for P2P networks that minimizes distribution 
of spurious files by a novel topology adaptation scheme. It also reduces search 
time since most of the queries are resolved within the community of trustworthy 
peers. Simulation results indicate that the trust management overhead due to the 
proposed mechanism decreases considerably as the network topology stabilizes.   
Keywords: P2P network, topology adaptation, trust management, semantic 
community, malicious peer, iterative DFS. 
1   Introduction 
The term peer-to-peer (P2P) system encompasses a broad set of distributed applica-
tions which allow sharing of computer resources (e.g. computing power, files, band-
width etc) by direct exchange between systems. The goal of a P2P system is to aggre-
gate resources available at the edge of the Internet and to share it cooperatively among 
users. Specially, the file sharing P2P systems have become popular as a new paradigm 
for information exchange among large number of users in internet scale due to their 
open, unrestricted, decentralized and anonymous nature.  
Depending on the presence of central server, P2P system can be classified as cen-
tralized or decentralized [1]. In decentralized architecture, both resource discovery 
and download are distributed. Decentralized P2P application may be further classified 
as structured or unstructured network. In structured network, there is restriction re-
garding the placement of content and network topology. This bounds the number of 
hops to locate resource. On the other hand in unstructured P2P network, e.g., 
Gnutella, content of placement is unrelated to topology. Unstructured P2P networks 
perform better than their structured counterparts in dynamic environment. However, 
they several problems which need attention such as fake content distribution, free 
riding (peers who do not share, but consume resources), whitewashing (peers who 
leave and rejoin the system in order to avoid penalties) etc.   
In this paper, a trust-aware, topology adaptation-based efficient searching algorithm 
is presented that is robust, scalable and light-weight and solves the existing problems 
in unstructured P2P networks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses some existing related work in the literature. Section 3 presents the proposed 
algorithm. Section 5 presents the results of simulations carried out on the algorithm. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper while highlighting some future scope of work.  
2   Related Work 
Several propositions exist in the literature for trust-based searching in unstructured 
P2P networks. The proposed mechanism in this paper has been motivated from the 
algorithms proposed in [2] and [3]. In [2], a protocol for the formation of adaptive 
topologies has been proposed to reduce inauthentic file download and free riding, 
where a peer connects to those peers from whom it is most likely to download satisfac-
tory content. This strategy is relaxed in [3], where a peer connects to those peers hav-
ing higher reciprocal capacity. Reciprocal capacity is defined based on peers’s capac-
ity of providing good files and of recommending source of download. In [4], a trust-
aware adaptive P2P topology is proposed using super peer to control free-riders and 
malicious peers. Various trust-based incentive schemes have been discussed in [5] to 
encourage sharing of large number of authentic files. The algorithm proposed in this 
paper is more efficient and robust than these algorithm since is uses a novel topology-
adaptation and trust management scheme as discussed in the subsequent sections. 
     
3   The Proposed Trust-Aware Algorithm  
This section describes the details of the proposed algorithm. The first subsection pre-
sents various design issues involved in the algorithm and the second subsection dis-
cusses the operational steps of the algorithm.  
3.1   Design issues of the proposed algorithm 
The various design issues of the algorithm are as follows:  
(1)Network topology and load: The network is modeled as a power law graph, in 
which the degree distribution of nodes follows power law distribution. The peers ad-
just topology locally to connect themselves with those peers that provide higher prob-
abilities of supplying authentic files. The network links are categorized into two types: 
connectivity link and community link. The connectivity links are the edges of the 
original power law network. The community links are added between the peers who 
trust each other. To control bandwidth usage and query processing overhead, an upper 
limit is put on the additional number of edges that a peer can acquire. If fi-
nal_degree(x) and initial_degree(x) be the initial and final degree of peer x, the rela-
tive increase in connectivity (RIC) is bounded by a parameter known as edge_limit.  
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(2) Content distribution: It has been shown that Gnutella content distribution fol-
lows zipf distribution [6]. Therefore, in the proposed algorithm, both content catego-
ries and file popularity within each category is modeled with zipf distribution with α = 
0.8. In this model, each file fc,r is represented by the tuple (c, r), where c is the content 
category of the file, and r represents its popularity rank within the category. Each 
content category is characterized by its popularity rank.  
(3) Query initiation model: The number of queries a peer issues in a simulation 
round is modeled as a Poisson distribution. If M is the total number of queries issued 
in each cycle of simulation and N is the number of peers, query rate N
M
=λ  is the 
mean of the Poisson process. The probability that a peer issues query for the file fc,r 
depends on the peer’s interest level in category c and the rank r of the file.  
(4) Trust management module: To enable a peer to compute the trustworthiness of 
other peers, a trust management module is designed. Each peer maintains a least re-
cently used (LRU) data structure to keep track of the recent transactions with 32 peers 
at a time. Every time the peer i downloads a file from peer j, it rates the transaction as 
either positive (trij=1) or negative (trij=-1) depending on whether downloaded file is 
authentic or fake.  The fraction of successful downloads (Sij) that peer i had made 
from peer j is recorded by i. If 5.0>ijS , i considers j as trustworthy;  if, 0<ijS , j is 
considered malicious. If 5.00 <≤ ijS , i seeks recommendations from others about j.  
3.2   The proposed trust-aware algorithm  
The two major steps of the algorithm are: (i) search and (ii) topology adaptation. 
These two modules are described in the rest of this section.  
(i) Search: The searching mechanism used is based on time to live (TTL). At each 
hop, a query is forwarded to a subset of neighbors. The number of neighbors to which 
the query is forwarded is based an estimate of network connectivity. This estimate is 
called the probability of community formation, Probcom, which for node x is computed 
in (2) 
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As simulation proceeds, connectivity of good peers increases and reaches an upper 
bound. These peers then focus on directing queries to appropriate community where a 
specific content may exist rather than expanding their communities. The search strat-
egy changes from TTL limited BFS to directed DFS. The search is carried out in two 
steps– query initiation and query forward as described below. 
Query initiation: The source peer forms a query packet containing the name of the 
file (c, r) and forwards it to a subset of neighbors along with Probcom and TTL value. 
The neighbors are ranked based on both trustworthiness and the similarity of interest. 
Preference is given to the trusted neighbors sharing similar content categories. Among 
the trusted neighbors, community members having content matched to the query are 
preferred. When there is insufficient number of community links, query is forwarded 
through connectivity links also.  
Query forward: When a query reaches from peer i to peer j, following actions are 
performed: (i) Check trust level of peer j: peer i checks trust rating of peer j through 
check trust rating algorithm (explained later). Accordingly decision of further propa-
gation of the query is taken. (ii) Check the availability of file: if the requested file is 
found, response is sent to peer j. If TTL has not expired, the following steps are exe-
cuted. (iii) Calculate number of messages to be sent: the number of messages is com-
puted based on the value of Probcom. (iv) Choose neighbors: Neighbors are chosen in 
using neighbor selection rule. The search process is shown in Figure 2, in which each 
query is sent to two neighbors. The matching community links are preferred over 
connectivity links. Peer i initiates query and forwards it to two community neighbors 3 
and 4. The query reaches peer 8 via peer 4. However, peer 8 knows from its previous 
experience that peer 4 is malicious. Hence it blocks the query. The query forwarded 
by peer 5 is also blocked by peer 10 and 11 as both of them know that peer 5 is mali-
cious. Subsequently, the query is matched at four peers: 4, 6, 9 and 13. 
(ii) Topology Adaptation: Responses are sorted in order of preference by the initiat-
ing peer i based on the reputation of resource providers. The peer having highest repu-
tation is selected as source of download. The requesting peer checks the authenticity 
of downloaded file. If the file is found to be fake, peer i attempts to download from 
other sources until it finds the authentic resource. It updates the trust rating and possi-
bly adapts topology to bring trusted peers in its neighborhood and to drop malicious 
peers from its community. The restructuring of network is controlled by a parameter 
known as degree of rewiring. It represents the probability with which a link is formed 
between two peers and plays a crucial role in topology adaptation. The adaptation 
consists of the following operations: (i) Link deletion: peer i deletes the community 
link with peer j if it finds the later as malicious. (ii) Link addition: peer i forms com-
munity link with peer j if the resource is found to be authentic. If 
edge_limitRIC ≤  for both peers i and j, then an edge is added subject to the ap-
proval of resource provider j. If  j finds peer i is malicious, it doesn’t approve the link.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The breadth first search (BFS) tree for the search procedure initiated by peer 1. 
4   Performance Evaluation 
To analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, following metrics have been 
used. These metrics are: (i) attempt ratio (AR), (ii) effective attempt ratio (EAR), and 
(iii) query miss ratio (QMR). AR is the probability that the user downloads the au-
thentic file in the first attempt. The search quality achieved by good peers should be 
compared to that provided by malicious peers. EAR makes this comparison. If P(i) is 
the total number of attempts made by peer i for an authentic file, EAR is given by (3): 
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M and N are the number of good and malicious peers issuing queries in a particular 
generation. QMR is defined as the ratio of the number of search failures to the total 
number of searches in a generation. Due to absence of semantic community initially, 
number of query misses will be high initially, which will fall later for good peers.  
A discrete time simulator written in C is used for simulation. In simulation, 6000 
peer nodes, 18000 connectivity edges, 32 content categories are chosen. The degree of 
deception and the degree of rewiring are taken as 0.1 and 0.3 respectively. The value 
of the edge_limit is taken as 0.3. The TTL values for BFS and DFS are taken as 5s 
and 10 s respectively. The discrete time simulator simulates the algorithm repeatedly 
on the power law network and outputs all the metrics averaged over generations. 
Barabasi-Alabert generator is used to generate initial power law graphs with 6000 
nodes and approximately 18000 edges. 
 
 
Figure 4. AR vs. percentage of malicious nodes: 10% in (a) and 20% in (b) 
 
Figure 4 shows the cost incurred by each type of peers to download authentic files. 
It is evident that the cost for downloading an authentic file decreases for a malicious 
peer as the percentage of malicious peers is increased. It is observed from Figure 5 (a) 
that with 10% malicious peers, EAR is 80. For good peers, since the queries are for-
warded via trusted peers at each hop, there is a high probability of downloading an 
authentic file in the first attempt. However, the queries from the malicious peers are 
blocked. As evident from Figure 5, the good peers have higher probability (compared 
to a malicious peer) of downloading an authentic file in the first attempt as long as the 
percentage of malicious peers does not exceed 60. 
Figure 6 shows QMR for various percentages of malicious peers. Initially, QMR is 
high as there are no interest-based communities. As the simulation proceeds, the que-
ries are forwarded through the community edges, and the QMR drops for good peers. 
Figure 6 shows that steady state value of QMR for good peers is less than 0.2. For 
malicious peers, QMR is higher since the queries from them are blocked.  
 
 
Figure 5. EAR vs. search generation for various percentages of malicious nodes 
 
 
Figure 6. QMR variations with various percentages of malicious peers in the network 
5   Conclusion 
In this paper, an efficient searching mechanism is proposed that solves a number of 
problems in P2P networks e.g., inauthentic download, free riding and poor search 
scalability. It has been shown that by judiciously evolving topology, it is possible to 
isolate the malicious peers while providing high query hit for good peers. The simula-
tion results have shown the efficiency and robustness of the proposed protocol.     
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